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INTRODUCTION

The Montana Supreme Court recently has had a profound effect on the functioning of the state's political system. This judgment is based upon the Court's decisions concerning the administration of justice' and welfare assistance2 sections of the Montana
Constitution. The court in these cases has relied upon questionable
interpretations of the state constitution and disregarded the legitimate processes and decisions of the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention, the Montana Legislature, and the democratic initiative. The court's activism, at least in the instances of tort reform
and welfare reform, has placed it inappropriately at the center of
the state's politics. The constitutional design for the state's political system will be realized only if the legislature is allowed to be, as
intended, the people's branch of government. The Montana Supreme Court should encourage this role rather than promote itself
as the legislature's rival in policy matters.
II.

THE LEGISLATURE IN MODERN MONTANA POLITICS

The Montana Legislature has had a shameful past. Thousands
* Professor and Chairman of the Political Science Department, University of Montana;
Ph.D., University of Notre Dame.
1. See White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983); Pfost v. State, Mont.
-,
713 P.2d 495 (1985).
2. See Butte Community Union v. Lewis, - Mont.
., 712 P.2d 1309 (1986).
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of students of the state's history have read accounts3 of legislators
selling their political souls to lobbyists of "the Company."" Even
legislators with the integrity to resist the temptations of eveningtime Helena frequently were overpowered by the expertise of corporate agents amidst the intense pressures" of legislative workload
and deadlines. It is a mistake, however, to think that the state's
political culture condones today this type of legislative behavior or
that the people of Montana have not officially condemned it. Discussion of the proper role of the Montana Legislature in the state's
political system should turn more upon the deliberations and decisions of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention than upon
vivid tales of lobbyists coaching from the gallery and legislators
drinking at the Placer Hotel watering hole. The modern Montana
Constitution called for a strong legislature kept close to the
electorate.
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention
were not ambiguous about their intentions for the lawmaking function. Their only uncertainty was whether the "shortcomings ' of
the legislature under the 1889 constitution would be best overcome
by a bicameral or unicameral body. The dominating philosophy of
the Legislative Committee, which informed both the bicameral and
unicameral proposals, was: "The power to make laws in a representative government is a power delegated to a specific unit of government . . . The people also reserve the power to remain a part of
the law-making structure by reserving to themselves the power to
initiate laws and repeal them."7 The delegates' principal point was
elementary but received emphasis: In Montana, an elected legislature is the proper body to make laws.
Unlike the state constitutional conventions of the late nineteenth century that sought to control legislative abuses by denying
powers,' the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention checked potential misbehavior through democratic controls. Montana voters
3. See, e.g., K. TOOLE, TWENTIETH CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF EXTREMES 259-60
(1972).
4. Montana historians and political commentators have reserved the phrase, "the company," for the activities of the Anaconda Company and the Montana Power Company during the first half of the twentieth century when their economic interests were mutual and
their reputed political power was astounding.
5. The "pressure cooker" metaphor is often used to describe the operations of the
Montana Legislature. Its origin is probably Waldron, The Legislative Assembly in a Modern Montana Constitution, 33 MONT. L. REV. 14, 48 (1972).
6. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-72, Vol. I, at 400 (1979) [hereinafter
MONT. CONST. CONV.].

7.
8.

Id.

See J. LOPACH,

WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA 3-4 (1983).
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could choose a bicameral or unicameral legislature, but either way
it would have features conducive of popular government. Delegates
provided for single-member districts because they would afford
"more accurate and accountable representation." Rural and urban
representation would be fair because it would be "proportionally
the same,"10 based on the United States Supreme Court's one person-one vote principle. And an "open and visible legislature"'"
would be achieved by mandates for meetings and hearings "open
to the public"' 2 and for recorded votes.' s
Because the Constitutional Convention made the idea of the
people's branch an operational reality, delegates did not hesitate to
empower fully the legislature. One delegate pointed out this trend
in the convention by saying, "we have left everything [else] under
the sun to the Legislature,"'" and another delegate commented
upon the "progressing tendency of this body, which was initiated
in almost the opening day of the debate and has been growing progressively ever since, to transfer responsibilities to the Legislature.""' Once again the convention knew what it was doing. The
legislative committee's comments on the majority proposal spoke
of the "need to restore the balance of power between the legislature and a permanent executive"' 16 and the need for the legislature
"to be equal to the other two branches of government."' 7 The constitutional design was, very simply, that the legislature would be a
strong lawmaking branch of government, both responsive and accountable to the people.
This should be the backdrop for commenting upon contemporary Montana legislative politics. The state supreme court should
define its role relative to the legislature in the Montana political
system with these principles and objectives in mind. The supreme
court, in disposing of cases which come before it, should use restraint as well as reasoning to assist the legislature to perform its
intended role. A court minority ignored such counsel in 1986 when
it criticized Constitutional Initiative 30 as a "long-term submission
to the unbridled will of the Legislature' 8 and said: "Any student
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Vol. VI,
15.
16.
17.
18.

MONT. CONST. CONY.,

Vol. I, at 408.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 387.
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10(3) (1972).
Id. at art. V, § 11(2).
Marian S. Erdmann as reported in the verbatim transcript, MONT. CONST. CONV.,
at 2289.
Miles Romney. Id. at 2297.
MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. I, at 385.
Id.
State ex rel. Montana Citizens for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Walter-
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of the long-time history of the Montana Legislature will recognize
the folly of that direction." 19 When the court wounds the legislature in its reputation and role, it upsets the governmental balance
created by the 1972 constitutional convention and causes dysfunction in the state's political system.

III.
A.

THE TORT REFORM STORY

Revising the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine

The tale of modern tort reform in Montana also has its beginning in the 1972 constitutional convention. Delegate Proposal No.
30 had the aim of "eliminating the defense of sovereign immunity," ' and the proposal of the Bill of Rights Committee contained the following language: "The state and its subdivisions shall
have no special immunity from suit."" Article II, section 18 of the
1972 Montana Constitution as ratified reads: "The state, counties,
cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities shall have
no immunity from suit for injury to a person or property. This provision shall apply only to causes of action arising after July 1,
1973." The comments of the Bill of Rights Committee emphasized
that any prior justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity
had been replaced by considerations of equity: "All parties should
receive fair and just redress whether the injuring party is a private
citizen or a governmental agency.""
The debate on sovereign immunity on the floor of the convention was not extensive and covered principally the existing doctrine, reform in other states, and what role reform would leave the
legislature. Speaking in support of his proposed amendment to add
the phrase, "for injury to a person or property"" (which was unanimously adopted), Delegate Otto Habedank argued that constitutional repeal of sovereign immunity would allow the legislature to
make adjustments: "Limited as it is, for injury to a person or property, the Legislature is still free to make it more open if they desire
to in the future. But we at least have assured the people of the
State of Montana that they can sue for negligent injury."" Then
Delegate Oscar Anderson questioned Bill of Rights Committee
spokesman, Delegate Marshall Murray, whether the committee
mire, - Mont.
,
, 729 P.2d 1283, 1296 (1986) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
20. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. I, at 124.
21. MONT. CONST. CoNv., Vol. II,
at 622.
22. Id. at 637.
23. MONT. CONST. CONy., Vol. V, at 1761.
24. Id.
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would object to the addition, "the Legislature may provide for reasonable limitations."28 Murray found no objection, commenting
that the North Dakota constitution contained such a provision."
Anderson, however, did not offer the amendment.
Such a change came two years later in the form of an amendment to the constitution. Fifty-five percent of the electorate approved the measure proposed by the legislature which permitted
the legislature to restore governmental immunity "as may be specifically provided by law by a two-thirds vote of each house of the
legislature."2 7 The legislature was seeking to stem the claims on
the public treasury since the new constitution had gone into effect.
There had been over $8 million in tort suits against the state and
$125,000 paid out in settlements and judgments. 28 The office of the
attorney general, in describing the measure for the ballot, said that
it "would allow specific exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity by two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature. '29 The
amendment specifically authorized an extraordinary majority of
the legislature to close the doors of the courts to civil suits against
the state.
The amendment became effective on July 1, 1975, and it was
implemented by the next legislature.3 0 The 1977 session made the
state and local government units immune from noneconomic damages and exemplary and punitive damages, and it extended immunity for "economic damages suffered as a result of an act or omission of an officer, agent, or employee of that entity in excess of
$300,000 for each claimant and $1 million for each occurrence. ' l
The legislature defined noneconomic damages as including recovery for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, mental distress, and
loss of reputation.2
B.

White v. State

In 1983 the Montana Supreme Court effectively wiped out this
chapter of governmental tort reform. The majority opinion in
White v. State,33 written by Justice Frank Morrison, completely
ignored the clear legislative authorization in the 1974 constitu25.
26.
27.

28.

Id. at 1763.
Id.
S.J. Res. 64, 43d Mont. Leg. (1974).
See E. WALDRON & P. WILSON, ATLAS OF MONTANA ELECTIONS 271 (1978).

29.

Id.

30.
31.

MONT. CODE ANN.

32.
33.

§§ 2-9-101 to -114 (1979).
§ 2-9-104(1)(b) (1979).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-101(2)(b) (1979).
203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN.
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tional amendment and ruled that the exceptions to state and local
tort immunity created by the legislature in 1977 were unconstitutional. The basis of the reasoning was a judicially discovered fundamental guarantee in the Montana Constitution, the right to
bring a civil action for all personal injuries, and substantive equal
protection analysis.3
The court majority found the right to bring a civil action for
full recovery for every injury in article II, section 16. The "administration of justice" provision reads:
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy
remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character.
No person shall be deprived of this full legal redress for injury
incurred in employment for which another person may be liable
except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who
hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage under
the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this state. Right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay. 5
The court said that the phrase "every injury embraces all recognized compensable components of injury, including the right to be
compensated for physical pain and mental anguish and the loss of
enjoyment of living."'36 After asserting without analysis that the
right to full recovery was "fundamental,
8

'. 7

the court reasoned that

"strict scrutiny attaches" to the alleged abridgement-the legislature's prohibition of recovery for noneconomic damages. The majority found that the 1977 implementation of the 1974 amendment
was unconstitutional because the state's argued interest of remaining solvent to provide necessary and inherently dangerous public
services was not compelling. 9 This ruling gave rise to another
equal protection question because it permitted unlimited recovery
for noneconomic damages while the statute limited recovery for economic damages. The court's solution was to void the discriminatory limits on economic damages, once again using the fundamental right/strict scrutiny equal protection analysis."0 Lastly, the
court upheld governmental immunity from punitive damages, using the rational basis test because the constitution does not grant a
right to collect such damages. 1
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 367-70, 661 P.2d at 1274-75.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
White, 203 Mont. at 369, 661 P.2d at 1275.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 370, 661 P.2d at 1275.
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The White decision is objectionable' 2 because it ignores the
legislature's legitimate role in governmental liability law as defined
by constitutional language and intent, judicial precedent, and accepted legal and political theory. Because the decision turns upon
the court's interpretation of article II, section 16, "the administration of justice," it is necessary to understand the work of the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention on that provision. The Montana Constitution of 1889 had a similar section. Article III, section
6 read: "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a
speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or
character; and that right and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay."' 3 The Bill of Rights Committee, in the comments on its proposal, said that its aim was to retain the 1889 administration of justice section "with one addition.""" The purpose
of the new language was to overturn the Ashcraft v. Montana
Power Co. 4 5 decision of the Montana Supreme Court which denied

an employee "redress against third parties for injuries caused by
them if his immediate employer is covered under the Workmen's
Compensation Law."' 6 The singularity of the change in the administration of justice section of the 1889 Constitution was mentioned
several times. The Bill of Rights Committee observed that the
Ashcraft decision violated the "spirit of the guarantee of a speedy
remedy for all injuries of person, property, or character."' But
then it stressed: "It is this specific denial-and this one only-that
the committee intends to alter ... ,"4' The committee referred to
the change as a "technical"' 9 matter, and on the convention floor
committee member Marshall Murray admitted that the committee
was "perhaps legislating" 50 in recommending that such a narrow
correction be written into the constitution.
Because the 1972 Constitutional Convention emphasized that
it was preserving, with one exception, the existing law of administration of justice, it is essential to understand the prevailing interpretation of the law surrounding article III, section 6 of the 1889
Montana Constitution. The Montana Supreme Court in the 1919
42. For a sympathetic analysis of the White decision and majority reasoning, see
Burke, ConstitutionalInitiative 30: What ConstitutionalRights Did Montanans Surrender
in Hopes of Securing Liability Insurance, 48 MONT. L. REv. 53 (1987).
43. MONT.CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 6.
44. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. II, at 636.
45. 156 Mont. 368, 480 P.2d 812 (1971).
46. MONT. CONST. CONY., Vol. II, at 636.
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 637.
50. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. V, at 1754.
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case of Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co.5 1 held that a plaintiff's
limited right of recovery through the Industrial Accident Board
did not raise a question of constitutional significance. The court
said that article III, section 6 meant that:
[tihe courts must be accessible to all persons alike, without discrimination, at the time or times and the place or places appointed for their sitting, and afford a speedy remedy for every
wrong recognized by law as being remediable in a court. The term
"injury" as therein used, means such an injury as the law recognizes or declares to be actionable. Many of the state Constitutions
contain similar provisions, and the courts, including our own,
have held either expressly or impliedly that their meaning is that
above stated.2
In 1976, after the new Montana Constitution was in effect, the constitutional interpretation was unchanged. The supreme court in
Reeves v. Ile Electric Co.,583 ruled that the force of article II, section 16 of the 1972 Constitution was identical to article III, section
6 of the 1889 Constitution: "Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff
would have a claim under common law, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited from eliminating a common law right as it
did in Shea and Stewart."54 The Reeves decision rejected a plaintiff's section 6 challenge to a statute which barred suit and held
that the "legislature may eliminate a remedy recognized by the
common law, together with all rights of action for an injury or
death." 5 Five years later the court's ruling on a similar question
was identical: "[a]ccess to the courts is not an independent fundamental right; access is only given such a status when another fundamental right-such as the right to dissolve the marital relationship-is at issue . . . . In cases not involving a fundamental right,
access
may be hindered if there exists a rational basis for doing
''5 6
SO. 9

The court majority in the White case, therefore, was hardly
justified in finding a fundamental right of access to the courts in
article II, section 16. The 1972 Constitutional Convention did not
so alter the meaning of the 1889 constitutional language it transplanted, and the court's own interpretation of the pertinent sec51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
part).
56.

55 Mont. 522, 179 P. 499 (1919).
Id. at 533, 179 P. at 502.
170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976).
Id. at 110, 551 P.2d at 651.
White, 203 Mont. at 376, 661 P.2d at 1279 (Weber, J., concurring and dissenting in
Linder v. Smith,

-

Mont ...
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tions of both constitutions rejected the existence of such a right. 7
Convention delegates were aware of other possible interpretations
of their work-that maybe, as Delegate Habedank related, "we
lawyers are writing the Constitution, trying to slip matters into
this Constitution for our own personal gain. ''5 There can be no
doubt that a fundamental right of access to the courts to seek full
recovery for every injury would be of economic benefit to plaintiffs'
attorneys. But Delegate Wade Dahood, Chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee and, himself, a trial lawyer, should have put an
end to such an interpretation of article II, section 16 when he responded on the convention floor to a charge that the proposed administration of justice section would prevent the legislature from
enacting a no-fault insurance law:
[I] wish to read the release that was made yesterday in response
to it: "It is totally beyond legal logic for everyone to contend that
the Bill of Rights proposal has an effect on the no-fault insurance
concept." . . . On behalf of the committee, I am going to add to
the comments in the Bill of Rights proposal, so that there can
never be any question about it under any circumstance nor by
anyone, the following: "Further, it is the intent of the committee
that the additional wording shall not be construed to preclude the
59
'
adoption of a no-fault insurance plan for the State of Montana.
If the legislature could alter access to the courts and remedies by
enacting no-fault insurance, certainly the legislature pursuant to
clear constitutional authorization could limit the liability of the
state's governmental units.
C. Pfost v. State
The White case was decided in April of 1983, and immediately
after the decision the Montana Legislature made a second attempt
to impose limitations on governmental liability pursuant to the
1974 constitutional amendment. The enactment read:
Neither the state, a county, municipality, taxing district, nor any
other political subdivision of the state is liable in tort action for
damages suffered as a result of an act or omission of an officer,
57. See Burke, supra note 42, at 64-79 for a discussion of the Montana Supreme
Court's changing interpretation of MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972). Burke documents the
court's reconceiving of its precedents and its switching from what she labels the "minimal
significance" interpretation to the "fundamental right" interpretation. Burke's discussion
presumes the court properly had complete discretion for choosing among available precedents and analyses from other states.
58. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. V, at 1758.
59. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. VII, at 2625.
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agent, or employee of that entity in excess of $300,000 for each
claimant and $1 million for each occurrence."
The legislature sought to avoid the censure of the supreme court
by omitting any reference to economic and noneconomic damages,
thus making the limitations generally applicable.
The legislature was unsuccessful. On December 31, 1985, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled in Pfost v. State6" that the new
limits of liability placed an unconstitutional restriction on a plaintiff seeking $6 million in damages. 2 The opinion of Justice John
Sheehy, which presented the views of the four-person majority, explained how the statutory provision violated the equal protection
clause of the Montana Constitution. The White case was central to
the court's reasoning:
In legal effect, § 2-9-107, is but § 2-9-104 in another guise. In each
case the injured party suffers a restriction of his right to full legal
redress. Our decision in White therefore controls the outcome of
this case-the legislature has invaded a fundamental right
granted to individuals, and it has not shown a compelling state
interest for doing so.6 3
The disturbing element of the court's opinion is the justices'
facility in overriding the judgment of the legislature. It is clear that
the 1983 enactment created two categories of litigants which were
treated differently: Those whose injuries amounted to $300,000 or
less and those with injuries over $300,000. Only plaintiffs in the
first group could receive full recovery. But the legislature's findings,6" which accompanied its action, demonstrated that the legislature acted with reflection and foundation, i.e., not arbitrarily.
Reasons offered for limiting governmental liability were inadequate insurance coverage, risks inherent in performing essential
governmental functions, and the likelihood of increased taxes and
decreased public services.6 ' The court, however, by determining
that full legal redress was a fundamental right, created a presumption of unconstitutionality and shifted to the political branches the
burden of proving a compelling state interest.
The court gave indication that it was well aware that its activism forced the state to prove more than a rational basis for its action. It reviewed the doctrine that state constitutional law is a
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

§ 2-9-107(1) (1983).
713 P.2d 495 (1985).
Mont. -,
713 P.2d at 496.
Id. at -,
713 P.2d at 504-05.
Id. at -,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-106 (1983).
, 713 P.2d at 504.
Mont. at Pfost, MONT. CODE ANN.
__
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body of legal principles independent of the federal constitution
and potentially more protective of individual rights. a6 It asserted
that it was capable of fashioning new fundamental rights through
its interpretation of the equal protection clause in the state constitution, even though the United States Supreme Court refused to
do so when interpreting the federal equal protection clause.67 And
it implied that article II, section 34 of the Montana Constitution a
could be the source of even more fundamental rights.6 9 One judgment of the politics of this episode is both old and new. This was
the judiciary legislating, but practiced this time in the state arena.
This simple tactic of finding a fundamental right and applying the
strict scrutiny analysis allowed the court to substitute its policy
discretion for that of the legislature.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Fred Weber expressed to
what degree the majority opinion had frustrated the workings of
the Montana political system:
The majority opinion in Pfost now tells the people, members
of the legislature and the governor that they cannot adopt a statute that in any way limits the dollar amount of recovery from the
State as legal redress for injury to person, property or character.
If limited sovereign immunity is to be granted, it requires either a limitation on the type of damages for which compensation
can be paid, or a dollar limitation upon the total amount of recovery. Both of these alternatives have now been effectively eliminated by the opinions of this Court. Absolute immunity appears
to be the only remaining alternative. However, whether a statute
that grants total sovereign immunity would still be permissible is
an unsettled question. The effect of White and Pfost appears to
be an improper judicial repeal of the exception in Art. II, § 18,
Mont. Const., as adopted by the people in 1974.70
Strategic options appeared to be exhausted because even constitutional amendment had failed the proponents of governmental tort
reform. The court had used two sections of the constitution against
another section-the equal protection and administration of justice
provisions-to check the specific authorization to limit governmental liability. The majority opinion, however, inadvertently pointed
out the next stage of the battle. Quoting the California Supreme
66.
67.

Id. at
Id. at

713 P.2d at 500.
713 P.2d at 502.

-,
-,

68. "The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people." MONT. CONST., art. II, § 34.
69.
70.

Pfost,
Id. at

-

,

Mont. at -,
713 P.2d at 504.
713 P.2d at 515 (Weber, J., dissenting).
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Court in Serrano v. Priest,71 Justice Sheehy wrote for the Pfost
majority: " 'A constitutional provision creating the duty and power
to legislate in a particular area always remains subject to general
constitutional requirements governing all legislation unless the intent of the Constitution to exempt it from such requirements

plainly appears.'

"72

The Pfost case was decided on the last day of 1985, and, by
the time the Forty-ninth Montana Legislature met in special session the following spring, a strengthened liability coalition was
making political progress. The reform movement's increased
strength came from the addition of interests seeking reform in private tort law, principally corporations and defense counsel. Their
concerns, goals, and strategy, which were almost identical to the
program of governmental tort reformers, have been expressed in an
unpublished discussion paper: "During recent years tort law in
Montana has changed dramatically . . . . the field of torts, as it
existed even five years ago, is no longer recognizable. These legal
changes, virtually all made through Montana Supreme Court decisions, have pointed solely in the direction of expanding plaintiffs'
rights."' "7 The two forces, after heated debate, partisan strife, and
seeming stalemate in the March, 1986, special session, finally came
together in an effort to amend the Montana Constitution.
At the start of the special session, Republican legislators
pushed for a constitutional referendum that would permit the legislature to bypass the Pfost decision and impose limits of liability
affecting both public and private tort suits. The Democrats' position was that the two kinds of tort liability should be treated separately. The parties also disagreed about what size of a legislative
majority should be required for imposing limits of liability. Republicans argued for simple majorities, while Democrats wanted two71.
(1977).
72.

18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907

Post, - Mont. at __
713 P.2d at 505.
73. J. STEPHENSON, THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM 1 (1986) (unpublished discussion pa-

per of the Montana Association of Defense Counsel (Hereafter MADC)). Stephenson, a
Great Falls, Montana, attorney, traces changes in Montana tort law from 1973 to 1986. Topics covered are "products liability," "elimination and restriction of affirmative defenses,"
"professional liability cases," "the 'bad faith' cases," "damages for emotional distress," "punitive damages," "tavern owners liability," "municipal liability," and "elimination of spousal
immunity." Stephenson concludes with his introductory theme: "We believe that when all of
these changes are lumped together, Montana has gone as far as, if not further than, any
other state in expanding tort remedies. Virtually all of this law, subject to the statutory
exceptions noted, has been created by the Montana Supreme Court." Id. at 18-19. Stephenson's solution for this judicial activism is legislative assertiveness: "MADC believes the legislature should assert its traditional legislative powers and place some checks and balances
upon the unrestrained expansion of our tort law system." Id. at 19.
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thirds of each house. Agreement was reached on the issue of combining public and private tort reform-the Democrats accepted the
Republican approach-but lack of compromise on the question of
legislative majorities killed any chance of proposing a constitutional referendum. The principal interests, though, united in the
successful Initiative 30 campaign.
D.

ConstitutionalInitiative 30

The petition to place Constitutional Amendment 30 on the
November 4, 1986, general election ballot called for three major
changes in article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution. The
intent for these alterations was a constitutional overruling of the
Montana Supreme Court's rulings in the White and Pfost cases.
The proposed amendment dropped the word "every" which modified the word "injury" in the section's first sentence, so it read:
"Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for injury of person, property, or character."7 The
second major change was elimination of the words "this full" in
section 16's second sentence, so it read: "No person shall be deprived of legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which
another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his
immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer
provides coverage under the Workmen's Compensation laws of this
state. ' 75 Finally, the proposed amendment added to section 16 the

following language applicable to both private and public tort
liability:
This section shall not be construed as a limitation upon the
authority of the legislature to enact statutes establishing, limiting,
modifying, or abolishing remedies, claims for relief, damages, or
allocations of responsibility for damages in any civil proceeding;
except that any express dollar limits on compensatory damages
for actual economic loss for bodily injury must be approved by a
two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature.7 6
The attorney general's statement on the petition form, which
presented that office's interpretation of the purpose and consequence of the proposed amendment, read:
This initiative would amend the Montana Constitution to authorize the Legislature to determine the rights and remedies for in74. Petition to Place Constitutional Amendment No. 30 on the Election Ballot 1
(1986).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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jury or damage to person, property, or character. Currently the
Constitution does not permit limits on these rights and remedies.
A two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature would be required to set dollar 77limits on damages for economic loss resulting
from bodily injury.
Constitutional Initiative 30 was the result of a long series of
political and legal battles involving technical points of political and
legal theory. Proper resolution of the matter called for the
strengths of representative government, not of direct democracy.
The initiative campaign was conducted on three levels of significance, and the first level, the public campaign, was fought on a
largely fictitious battleground created by the contenders. The proponents' arguments suggested that passage would result in lower
insurance rates and attorney fees, while opponents said that the
amendment would result in even higher insurance company profits
and loss of constitutional guarantees, such as "the right of privacy,
the right to open meetings, the right to private property and ownership as well as other important rights. '78 The second level of significance implicated the interests of those most intensely involved.
Municipal and business corporations and defense counsel championed the Montana Legislature as the shaper of liability law, while
trial attorneys, as the representatives of future plaintiffs, argued
that the Montana Supreme Court should have final say in liability
law. Outside of the narrow confines of voter manipulation and special interest was the third perspective on the campaign. The issue
here was, should Montana follow the modern trend in American
politics and continue to weaken its legislature. The Montana electorate, probably not addressing the question of who should govern
in the state, ratified the proposed amendment by giving it 55 percent of the vote.7 9
The November 4, 1986, balloting did not take place without
challenge. A group known as Montanans for the Preservation of
Citizens' Rights and other plaintiffs invoked the original jurisdiction of the Montana Supreme Court in late August, 1986, seeking a
declaration that Initiative 30 was unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the measure from going to the voters.8 0 The plain77. Id.
78. J. O'Brien, D. Bradley, J. Hoyt, S. Morrison, & K. Englund, Argument Against
Constitutional Initiative No. 30, 1986 Voter Information Pamphlet 9 (1986).
79. The Missoulian, on November 6, 1986, reported the outcome of the Constitutional
Initiative 30 balloting. With 100 percent of the results, 172,260 voters were for the measure
and 136,594 voters were against the measure. Missoulian, Nov. 6, 1986, col. 1.
80. Application for Writ of Injunction and Brief for Plaintiffs and Relators, State ex
- Mont. -, 729
rel. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire,
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tiffs made four principal arguments that Constitutional Amendment Initiative 30 was unconstitutional and void: (1) "it attempts
more than one amendment by one ballot measure thus precluding
a separate vote on each"; 8 (2) it attempts to transfer judicial powers belonging in the judicial branch to the legislative branch in vio-;82 (3) the attorney genlation of the separation of powers .
eral's statement of purpose appearing on the petition form "is
misleading, untrue and written so as to create prejudice in favor of
the measure .... ";a' and (4) the attorney general's statement of
implication appearing on the petition form "is untrue, misleading
and written so as to create prejudice in favor of the
."84
The Montana Supreme Court heard oral argumeasure
ment on October 7, 1986, and issued its order on the same day. 5 A
majority of four (Chief Justice Jean Turnage, and Justices Fred
Weber, John Harrison, and L.C. Gulbrandson) denied the writ of
injunction. The Pfost minority plus Justice Harrison comprised
the new majority. Dissenting were Justices John Sheehy, William
Hunt, and Joseph Gary (sitting in place of Justice Frank
Morrison).
After the election the same set of plaintiffs called upon the
Montana Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction to declare unconstitutional and void the initiative and the election and to enjoin
the canvassing of the votes and the certification of the results. 8
Because the court majority in the pre-election case had denied an
injunction on the grounds of respect for the initiative process, 87 the
plaintiffs' case had not been disposed of on the merits. As a result,
the plaintiffs in their second appearance incorporated "all allegations set forth in their original Application for Writ of Injunction" 88 and included several additional arguments. The Montana
Secretary of State's Voter Information Pamphlet, plaintiffs alleged,
was "misleading, untrue, and prejudicial,"'8 9 and the secretary of
P.2d 1283 (1986).
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 15.
85. State ex rel. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire,
- Mont. at -,
729 P.2d at 1283.
86. Amended Application for Writ of Injunction and Brief for Plaintiffs and Relators,
State ex rel. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, Docket 86400 [hereinafter Amended Application].
Mont. at
87. State ex ret. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights, -,
729 P.2d at 1285-86.
88. Amended Application, supra note 85, at 1.
89. Id. at 3.
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state published in the newspapers of the state a summary rather
than the full text of the amendment, as required by the Montana
Constitution."'
The supreme court, in the second Montanans for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights case, thus had before it a wide variety of
arguments for deciding whether to void Initiative 30. Of these
probably the most surprising was the central issue of White and
Pfost, whether the administration of justice provision of the Montana Constitution was an historic fundamental right. The presence
of this issue was surprising because of the firmness of the court's
rulings in White and Pfost. The continued appearance of the issue,
however, is not surprising because its resolution defines the critical
roles and relationship of the court and legislature in the Montana
political system.
The issue was raised in the plaintiff's assertion that the attorney general's statements of purpose and implication concerning Initiative 30 were false, misleading, and prejudicial. In this context
plaintiffs argued orally before the court that the right of full recovery for every injury had "always been a 'fundamental right' limiting the legislature from limiting rights and remedies in lawsuits."9 1
The Montana Liability Coalition responded in its reply brief that
White and Pfost represented the court's "creation out of whole
cloth of a 'fundamental right' limiting the legislature. '92 Attorneys
for the Montana Liability Coalition used an historical analysis going back to the Magna Carta to show that "England, Montana and
other states in the United States and the court cases in those
states totally reject" the concept that access to the courts is a fundamental right.9 3 This argument continued that nearly identical
provisions in other state constitutions had been interpreted "contrary to the holdings of the Montana Supreme Court. '9 4 Provisions
90. Id. at 7-8.
91. Supplemental Reply Brief of Montana Liability Coalition, Real Party in Interest
at 43, State ex rel. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizens Rights v. Waltermire, Docket
No. 86-400 [hereinafter "Supplemental Reply Brief"].
92. Id.
93. Id. But see Burke, supra note 42, at 55-57 and n.16 at 56 for a discussion of "three
standard but conflicting interpretations by the highest court of the states" of "access and
remedy provisions in state constitutions." Id. at 57. Burke argues that "[alt least one state
has interpreted the provision to recognize a fundamental constitutional right to a remedy
for all injuries." Id. at 56. However, she explains that the constitutional provision in that
state, Arizona, is not exactly an "open court provision": "[A]rizona has a more specific constitutional requirement. Article 18, § 6 provides, 'The right of action to recover damages for
injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation.'" Id. at 56, n.17.
94. Supplemental Reply Brief, supra note 90, at 48.
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"guaranteeing to every person a remedy by due course of law for
injury done him in person or property" 95 were found not to include
a fundamental right sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny (Louisiana
and New Hampshire);9" to be a mandate to the judiciary and not a
limitation on the legislative branch (Oklahoma);97 and to refer to a
remedy provided by statute or common law, not being a delegation
to the courts to legislate a remedy (Tennessee).9
It seemed unlikely that the supreme court would void Constitutional Initiative 30 for substantive reasons. The White and Pfost
rulings that the amendment addressed were bold assertions of policy and ignored the value of predictability in the state's law. To
reject again the careful design of a constitutional amendment
would have portrayed the justices as far less judicial than even
they wanted to be seen. A four-justice majority (Sheehy, Harrison,
Hunt, and Gary), however, felt comfortable in striking down the
amendment on procedural grounds. 9

IV.

THE WELFARE REFORM STORY

The Montana Supreme Court maintained center stage in the
long tort reform drama because of its willingness to find and enforce a fundamental constitutional right. Well aware of the court's
activism, litigants either played to this disposition or created increasingly elaborate arguments to offset it. The strength of the
court's bent can also be appreciated in the unraveling of another
story of court-legislature conflict, that of welfare reform. The judicial involvement here follows the same pattern as tort reform. The
court ignored constitutional intent and legislative prerogative and
installed itself as the state's chief policy maker.
A.

Welfare Policy in the 1972 Constitutional Convention

As with tort reform, the discussion of welfare reform must be
grounded in the state constitution. Two committees of the 1972
constitutional convention took up the issue of public assistance.
The Bill of Rights Committee considered whether the constitution
should contain a fundamental right to the necessities of life, and
the Public Health, Welfare, Labor and Industry Committee dealt
with the state's role in providing welfare payments. The two com95. Id. at 47.
96. Id. at 48.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 49.
99. State ex rel. Montana Citizens for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, Mont. -,
P.2d -, 44 St. Rptr. 913 (1987).
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mittees met together and held a joint hearing concerning their
common concern. 0 0 Their agreed upon conclusions were that welfare assistance was not a fundamental right and its provision
rested with the discretion of the legislature.
Testimony before the two committees detailed the failings of
the state welfare program and urged the identification of a right to
public assistance. 101 The proposal of the Bill of Rights Committee
for the "Inalienable Rights" section arguably hinted in that direction. It read: "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights which include the right of pursuing life's basic necessities . . ."102 But this was, said Delegate Lyle Monroe, nothing
more than a "constitutional sermon so that maybe the Legislature,
from time to time, can improve and update-and upgrade our public assistance program from time to time as they see fit."' 0 3 It was
not, the Bill of Rights Committee report said, a constitutional
guarantee of welfare assistance: "The intent of the committee on
this point is not to create a substantive right for all for the necessities of life to be provided by the public treasury."'0 4 The pertinent
language in the committee's proposal, the right "of pursuing life's
basic necessities," appears in the ratified 1972 constitution.' 5
The remarks and product of the Public Health, Welfare, Labor and Industry Committee reflect the same two themes: no fundamental right to welfare assistance and commitment of this policy
area to the legislature's discretion. In consideration was article X,
section 5 of the 1889 Montana Constitution. It read: "The several
counties of the state shall provide as may be prescribed by law for
those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity or misfortune,
may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society."'0 6 The
committee's principal concern was which level of government, state
or local, should carry the funding responsibility for welfare assistance. Three options were discussed: the counties, as was the present case, the state, or leaving the choice to the discretion of the
legislature. 10 7 The committee rejected county funding because it
was clear that population mobility, mainly moving from rural to
urban areas, created funding inequities. 0 8 Giving the state the re100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.

MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.

CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.

CONY.,
CONY.,
CONY.,
COy.,
CONY.,

Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.

VI, at 2278.
V, at 1637.
II, at 626.
V, at 1637.
II, at 627.

art II, § 3 (1972).
§ 5.

MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. X,

MONT. CONST. CONY., Vol. II, at 675.
MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. VI, at 2280.
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sponsibility of paying for welfare assistance was also rejected by
the committee: "We believed that this would be equally as restrictive as the existing section and believe the matter should be one
for legislative discretion."' 9 This was the agreed upon solution.
The committee proposal read: "It shall be the duty of the Legislative Assembly to provide economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who,
by reason of age, infirmities or misfortune may have need for the
aid of society."' 110 In its comments the committee contrasted this
language to the county oriented 1889 constitutional provision and
said that its intent was "to provide that the legislative assembly
shall decide where this tax burden should rest, counties as at the
present or a state wide levy, or some combination thereof.""' The
ultimate, relevant language of the 1972 Montana Constitution was:
"The legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social
and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have
need for the aid of society.""'
Discussion on the convention floor concerning the Public
Health, Welfare, Labor and Industry Committee's proposal for economic assistance revealed confusion, provoked suggestions for
amendment, and elicited clarifying statements. Delegate William
Swanberg spoke for the committee and emphasized that the committee's proposal shifted funding responsibility from counties to
.the discretion of the legislature.'" Then Delegate Charles McNeil
for the first of several times pointed out what he determined to be
the essential change from the 1889 language: "The majority proposal establishes a constitutional right to a claim for the same necessary services, for the same economic assistance . . . . Our present
Constitution has a permissive 'may,' where this is mandatory." " "
McNeil's proposed remedy was deletion of the economic assistance
5
provision."
The floor discussion on the McNeil motion focused on the desirability of making the state the responsible agent for welfare service and not on whether the proposal created a right to such assistance. Delegate Lyle Monroe said: "[t]hose people who cannot
otherwise provide for themselves is [sic] the responsibility of soci109.
110.
111.
112.

113.
114.
115.

MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. II, at 675.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 675.
MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (1972).
MONT. CONST. CONW., Vol. VI, at 2278-81.
Id. at 2285.
Id.
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ety . . . the responsibility should lie with the state."1 16 Delegate
Harold Arbanas made the same point: "What I saw happening in
the Convention . . . was a move away from the local and county
And I would read this article in the Public Health and Welfare as following that same trend. . .. ,,v In response to a request
to summarize the intent of the economic assistance section, Leo
Graybill, President of the Constitutional Convention, said:
Well, the committee report in section 2, says that the Legislative
Assembly which of course, is the state shall provide economic
such economic assistance as is necessary . . . and the present
Constitution involves the counties. And Mr. Swanberg has made
it clear that, while they didn't assign the duty to the state, they're
leaving it open under section 2 to the State Legislature, whether
to have it statewide or countywide. I don't think we're determining; we're giving the power to the Legislature. 18
No delegates responded when President Graybill concluded, "Now
if any members of the committee think I have misstated the sec9
tion, please speak up.""
Just prior to the vote on his motion, Delegate McNeil protested that the convention had not understood his intent: "[a]ll of
the comments here . . . have been oriented toward whether it's going to be a shift from the county to the state. My concern is we're
shifting from the Legislative 'may' provide economic assistance to
a shift to a constitutional mandate that they 'shall.' "120 McNeil's
motion to delete the economic assistance section failed, 30 to 59.
He immediately brought the matter again before the convention
with a motion to substitute "The Legislature may" for "It shall be
the duty of the Legislative Assembly to."1"' His purpose was to
force the delegates to vote directly on the issue of whether the proposed economic assistance section should contain "a constitutional
right to welfare.' '"22
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention show that
Delegate McNeil's second motion was not received as he wished.
While one delegate, who served on the Bill of Rights Committee
and seemed unaware of the consequence of its work concerning
welfare assistance, claimed that "all of us have a right to assistance
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2286.
at 2287.
at 2290.
at 2291.
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if we cannot provide for ourselves, ' 123 Delegate George Heliker,
Chairman of the Public Health, Welfare, Labor and Industry Committee, argued that the motion was unnecessary because the proposed economic assistance section did not establish a right to welfare. Rather, it left the matter to the discretion of the legislature.
Committee chairman Heliker said: "this is not an issue it seems to
me that you should get unnecessarily excited about, and I direct
your attention to the language 'as may be necessary,' which leaves
it to the Legislature."' 2 4 In response to a subsequent motion of
similar intent that would have inserted the phrase "methods for"
between the phrases "It shall be the duty of the Legislative Assembly to provide" and "economic assistance,' ' 25 Heliker made his
point again:
It [the proposed change] is unnecessary, superfluous, and besides,
it's excess baggage. The language of the majority is perfectly
clear-"the Legislature shall provide," and that leaves it to the
Legislature to find the means and the methods and the funds to
provide, and they may do it as they see fit. 2 6
Convention delegates rejected the second McNeil motion by a vote
of 27 to 64.127 The subsequent and third motion also was rejected,
36 to 52.121 These votes do not stand for the proposition that delegates wrote a right to welfare into the constitution. They instead
indicate that the delegates saw no need for the proposed changes.
The majority report of the welfare committee and the state constitution as ratified made welfare assistance a matter for the deliberation and determination of the legislature.
B.

The Court Checks Legislative Implementation

In 1985 the Montana Legislature had the occasion to use this
policy-making discretion granted by the constitution. The fortyninth legislative session was dominated by budgetary politics. Legislators were faced with expanding demands and, at best, the prospect of no increase in state revenue over the next biennium. The
partisan battle between program reductions and new. taxes was
largely resolved in favor of the Republican approach. In the area of
welfare policy this meant reducing or eliminating benefits for certain recipients. The specific categories slated for special treatment
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Delegate Lyle Monroe, id.
Id. at 2293.
Id. at 2297.
Id. at 2298-99.
Id. at 2293-94.
Id. at 2299-300.
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were able-bodied persons without dependent minor children who
were under thirty-five years of age or between the ages of thirtyfive and fifty. The first group was made not eligible for general
relief assistance;'"' the second group could receive welfare aid for
no more than three months in any twelve-month period. 3 '
A challenge to such legislative discrimination among classes of
potential welfare recipients was inevitable. The Butte Community
Union sought to enjoin enforcement of the new welfare law, and
the Montana Supreme Court in 1986 declared the law unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunction.' The opinion, written
by Justice Frank Morrison for an unanimous court, turned aside
the argument that there was a constitutional right to welfare assistance.' But the court found that welfare benefits were of such
constitutional significance that the justices could feel free in substituting their judgment for that of the legislators concerning what
kind of welfare system was appropriate for the state.'33 The vehicle
of this judicial activism was a new equal protection analysis devised and applied by the court.
If the court had determined that the Montana Constitution
contained a fundamental right to welfare, then it would have been
prepared to use the strict scrutiny/compelling interest test employed in the tort reform cases. There was, however, no basis for
such a finding. Ordinarily, this would have left the court with the
reasonable relationship test for determining the constitutionality
of the legislature's welfare classifications. Such an analysis would
have called for a presumption of constitutionality that would have
been sustained if the legislature had some reasonable basis for its
action-i.e., if there had been a reasonable relationship between
129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-205(3) (1985) read: "Able-bodied persons under the age
of 35 years without dependent minor children living in the household are not eligible for
nonmedical general relief assistance."
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-209(2) (1985) read: "Able-bodied persons age 35 through
49 without dependent minor children living in the household are eligible for no more than 3
months of non-medical general relief assistance within any 12-month period ....
"
131. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, Mont.
., 712 P.2d 1309 (1986).

132. Justice Morrison wrote: "We find that the Montana Constitution does not establish a fundamental right to welfare for the aged, infirm or misfortunate. . . . In order to be
fundamental, a right must be found within Montana's Declaration of Rights or be a right
'without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.' Welfare
is neither." Id. at

-

, 712 P.2d at 1311 (citing Matter of C.H.,

-

Mont.

683

P.2d 931, 940 (1984)).
133. Justice Morrison wrote: "[b]ecause the constitutional convention delegates
deemed welfare to be sufficiently important to warrant reference in the Constitution, we
hold that a classification which abridges welfare benefits is subject to a heightened scrutiny
under an equal protection analysis and that HB 843 must fall under such scrutiny." Butte
Community Union, -

Mont. at

-,

712 P.2d at 1311.
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the welfare classifications used and the legislature's purpose of operating a fiscally responsible public assistance program. 3 4 That
test is by its terms deferential to the legislature, and its result was
avoided by nonemployment. The justices then resorted to contrivance to achieve their desired result. The Montana Supreme Court
followed the lead of United States Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall in Dandridge v. Williams.' 5" There "Marshall
states in his dissent that welfare does not fit in the two classifications and that classifications in welfare favor an interventionist approach on the part of the Court."'3 6
The United States Supreme Court had developed a third or
heightened scrutiny equal protection analysis and used it sparingly, most notably in gender classification cases. 3 7 This mid-level
approach undoubtedly represented a compromise among justices
after the Equal Rights Amendment failed of ratification. One position on the Court was that gender should be a suspect classification, while other justices would have continued to apply the traditional equal protection analysis.3 8 The new formula called for an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based governmental action and proof of a "substantial relationship" between
the governmental goal and the means employed.1 9 The United
States Supreme Court, however, refused to allow welfare benefits
to qualify for such mid-level equal protection analysis. " 0
The Montana Supreme Court knew well that it was not obligated by the national court's ruling because the state case was argued under the Montana Constitution. Justice Morrison wrote:
"We will not be bound by decisions of the United States Supreme
Court where independent state grounds exist for developing
134. Id. at __, 712 P.2d at 1312.
135. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
136. Butte Community Union, - Mont. at , 712 P.2d at 1313.
137. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
1:38. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In a plurality opinion, Justices
Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall argued that sex classifications were inherently
suspect.
139. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 461 (1981)).
140. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487. Professor Laurence H. Tribe gave the following analysis of Dandridge: "The assumption in Dandridge was that laws distributing welfare benefits do not 'affect. . . freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,' [Id. at 484.] and that 'the
myriad of potential recipients' with claims to 'limited public welfare funds' [Id. at 487.1
represent a monolithic group among whom invidious distinctions are difficult to perceive.
The wide berth afforded legislative judgments is thus thought to result from the remoteness
of such judgments from the fundamental interests and suspect classifications that are necessary to trigger strict scrutiny." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1128 (1978).
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heightened and expanded rights under our state constitution."''
The Montana court thereby made its intent clear. The justices
would give access to welfare benefits a significance that was denied
by both the Montana Constitutional Convention and the Montana
Legislature. Operating within the substantial discretion provided
by independent and adequate state grounds, the Montana court
picked and chose among available United States Supreme Court
actions-adopting the mid-level test, rejecting the Dandridge majority's refusal to apply it to social welfare benefits, and adopting
the civil rights activism of Justice Marshall. The Montana court's
prerogative of judicial review and its freedom to choose the factors
of its analysis, a politically charged discretion, made the court arbiter of the state's welfare policy.
The beginning point of the Montana Supreme Court's analysis
is the state constitution's treatment of welfare assistance. The justices interpreted article XII, section 3(3)14

as "[d]irect[ing]

the

Legislature to provide necessary assistance to the misfortunate,"" 3
rather than as directing the legislature to provide such assistance
as the legislature deems is necessary. This mention of welfare benefits in the state constitution, the justices argued, makes "a right
to welfare" of such importance that its "abridgement requires
something more than a rational relationship to a governmental objective.'

144

This meant that the court was to take welfare policy

away from the legislature: "The old rational basis test allows government to discriminate among classes of people for the most
whimsical reasons. Welfare benefits grounded in the Constitution
itself are deserving of great protection."' "
The court's vehicle for moving into the area of welfare policy
was a "meaningful middle-tier analysis," a "balancing" test which
considered the "constitutionally significant interests" involved and
the "governmental interest to be served by such infringement.' ' 6
Justice Morrison wrote for the court:
We hold that a finding that HB 843 is constitutional requires the
State to demonstrate two factors: (1) that its classification of welfare recipients on the basis of age is reasonable; and (2) that its
interest in classifying welfare recipients on the basis of age is
141.
142.

Butte Community Union, Mont. at , 712 P.2d at 1313.
"The legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilita-

tive services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who by reason of age, infirmities, or
misfortune may have need for the aid of society."
143. Butte Community Union, - Mont. at
144. Id.
145. Id. at -,
712 P.2d at 1314.
146. Id.
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more important than the people's interest in obtaining welfare

benefits. 147
The court, in applying the reasonableness part of its test, clearly
did not equate it with the deferential test of rationality in the
traditional equal protection analysis. There, "reasonable" means
some basis for a legislative judgment or not totally willful. Here
the court said the legislature's action was "arbitrary,""" or without
reasonable foundation, because the "state has failed to show that
misfortunate people under the age of 50 are more capable of surviving without assistance than people over the age of 50."""It was
not enough that the legislature, in its considered judgment,
thought that such was the case in the ordinary nature of things. It
was enough that the judges thought that the legislators were
wrong; consequently, the judges substituted their opinion.
The Montana Supreme Court's use of a balancing analysis
provided an opportunity for the justices to put into effect their
own policy calculus. Balancing "deeply involves judges in policy
choices' ' 150 because it consists of weighing competing interests.
When one of the factors is a fundamental right that the people
have enshrined explicitly in the constitution, the judge's role is relatively clear because the constitution itself supplies the reasoned
justification. But when the balance is to be struck between interests that the constitution has left to the legislature, the judge's role
is problematic. Then balancing is "little more than a ritual incantation that masks from judges as well as observers the true
processes of interpretation." '' Behind the mask judges are acting
as legislators:
[W]hen one looks behind the metaphor one is usually left with an
explanation that says no more than: "In this situation, the claims
of Interest A outweigh the claims of Interest B." That sort of
statement announces a decision, it does not provide a reasoned
justification. Cardozo frankly conceded the point: "If you ask how
he [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another, I
can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief,
from life itself."'16
Despite the Montana Supreme Court's protestation that it
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. W. MURPHY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 311 (1986).
151. Id. at 312.
152. Id. (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921)).
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"does not pass on the merits of welfare,' 53 that is exactly what it
did. Assertion rather than justification and activism rather than
deference were the principal ingredients of the court's balancing
analysis:
Next, the state's objective in enacting HB 843-saving
money-must be balanced against the interest of misfortunate
people under the age of 50 in receiving financial assistance from
the State. The trial record does not show the State to be in such a
financially unsound position that the welfare benefit granted constitutionally, can be abrogated."5
Two elements in the court's statement are determinative of the
judgment of unconstitutionality. First, the court shows no respect
for the legislature's processes of representation and deliberation in
that body's arriving at a conclusion about the state's financial condition.15 5 Secondly, the court assigns a meaning to the state constitution's mention of welfare benefits that the constitutional conven156
tion did not intend.
The effect of the supreme court's ruling in Butte Community
Union has been disruption of Montana's political system. The
court's activism has frustrated successive meetings of the state legislature where a central concern was containing welfare spending.
The initial irony is, of course, that delegates to the Montana Constitutional Convention thought that they were leaving the continuing oversight of welfare policy to the legislative process. The final
irony is the 1987 legislature's consideration of a constitutional
amendment to grant the legislature complete discretion in making
welfare policy.
153. Butte Community Union, __
Mont. at , 712 P.2d at 1314.
154. Id.
155. See Note, Butte Community Union v. Lewis: A New Constitutional Standardfor
Evaluating General Assistance Legislation, 48 MONT. L. REv. 163, 176 (1987) (authored by
Scott C. Wurster) for a brief discussion of the separation of powers implication of the Butte
Community Union decision.
156. The forty-ninth session of the Montana Legislature, meeting in special session in
June 1986, enacted legislation which limited general relief assistance for all able-bodied persons without dependent minor children to two months within any twelve-month period (ch.
10, § 1, Spec. Sess. June 1986). The Butte Community Union again challenged the legislature's attempt to limit welfare assistance. The District Court of Montana's First Judicial
District found the limitation to be unconstitutional, saying: "This case is controlled by the
test established by the Montana Supreme Court in Butte Community Union v. Lewis, Mont. -,
712 P. 2d 1309 (1986)." Butte Community Union v. Lewis, Cause No. 50268,
decided December 30, 1986, at 7. The Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services has indicated it will appeal the decision to the Montana Supreme Court. The Missoulian, Judge blocks welfare change, Dec. 31, 1986, p. 1, col. 6.
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V.

LITTLE WARREN COURTS

In recent years there has been a considerable amount of writing about the potential and expanding role of state constitutions in
American public law. 1 57 These documents, through imaginative advocacy and state judicial decision, have become the foundation of
doctrinal change that has been unobtainable through the federal
judiciary interpreting the United States Constitution. Commentators observe that state constitutions are not the mirror image of
the United States Constitution, and, similarly, state supreme
courts should not feel themselves bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of provisions in the federal document
that are identical or analogous to language in state constitutions.
Thus, in the era of the Burger Court or the Rehnquist Court, respect by the high court for the independent and adequate state
grounds doctrine would allow a state supreme court to become a
little Warren Court. The desirability of this development, though,
is a different matter than its possibility.
The appropriateness of judicial activism should depend upon
political theory and not policy results. Where the state constitution
explicitly contains fundamental rights that are not found in the
United States Constitution, the state supreme court should feel
free to develop its own jurisprudence for those guarantees. Where
the state constitution contains the same explicit fundamental
rights as found in the United States Constitution, the state supreme court should feel free to develop a jurisprudence more protective of those freedoms than formulated by the United States
Supreme Court. Examples in the Montana Constitution of the first
category of rights are the right to a clean and healthful environment, 158 the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, 59 the
right of participation,6 0 the right to know,"' the right of privacy,16 2 and the right to bear arms.' The second category of
rights, Montana equivalents of federal constitutional guarantees,
157. See STATE SUPREME COURTS (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1981); Howard, State
Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976);
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977); Elison & NettikSimmons, Federalism and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine
of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REV. 177 (1984); Howard, The
Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 63 U. VA. NEWSLETTER 1 (1986).
158. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
159. Id. at art. II, § 4.
160. Id. at art. II, § 8.
161. Id. at art. II, § 9.
162. Id. at art. II, § 10.
163. Id. at art. II, § 12.
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' 4
are free exercise of religion,16
freedom of speech,'6 5 freedom of as6
a
sembly,' and due process of law. 6 7 Mainline American political
theory argues that the judiciary has a special role in protecting
rights given a fundamental status by the constitution. There is an
ill fit, however, between democratic theory and a judicial activism
propelled by a mixture of judicially discovered rights and desired
results. One well known commentator has denounced this offshoot
of the "renaissance of state constitutional law":

The case for an independent role for state courts should not
be taken to be a case for unthinking activism. Judges are not
knights errant, charged with doing good at every turn in the road.
Judicial review by state courts, like that in federal courts, raises
important questions about the proper place in a democratic society for counter-majoritarian court decisions.
The debate, familiar in both academic and popular circles,
over the legitimate bounds of judicial review by federal courts
raises questions that apply, in somewhat altered form, to state
court's displacing legislative or other political judgments.'68
It is not difficult to identify some reasons why the caution
against judicial activism applies "in somewhat altered form" to the
states. Often state supreme court justices are elected, as they are in
Montana, and thus there exists an avenue of accountability absent
at the federal level. State constitutions are easier to amend and, in
fact, are amended more often than the United States Constitution.
In Montana this is made possible by two methods of proposing
amendments, legislative resolution' 6 9 and citizen initiative.'70 The
result is that it is not impossible for a state citizenry to check an
adventurous court. State courts are much more a part of the English common law tradition than is the federal judiciary, a heritage
of judge-made law. Even with considerable codification of substantive law in the twentieth century, the American legal system remains a mixture of common law and statutory law. This hybrid
legal framework leaves the state judiciary substantial lawmaking
discretion and admits of a justification rooted in a savior
metaphor:
[iut is only within the past ten or fifteen years that there have
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at art. II, § 5.
Id. at art. II, § 7.
Id. at art. II, § 6.
Id. at art. II, § 17.
Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, supra note 156, at 4.

169.
170.

MONT. CONST. art. XIV,
Id. at art. XIV, § 9.

§

8.
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been suggestions in some judicial opinions to the effect that
courts, faced with an obsolete statute and a history of legislative
inaction, may take matters into their own hands and do whatever
justice and good sense may seem to require. These suggestions
have, for the most part, been put forward with an understandable
degree of hesitant reluctance. As the idea becomes more familiar
to us, I dare say that we will come to see that the reformulation of
an obsolete statutory provision is quite as legitimately within judicial competence as the reformulation of an obsolete common
law rule.'

The countervailing arguments are quite evident and convincing. A state court's reworking of a statute is of much less serious
concern than its revision of a constitution. Even statutory law in
Montana has some special standing.17 2 After New York rejected in
the mid-nineteenth century the original substantive codes of David
Dudley Field, Montana-along with North Dakota, South Dakota,
Idaho, and California-gave them a home. 17 Some of the motivation for this legal pioneering must have been the typical pro-code
sentiment of "taking excess power away from judges,' 74 as undoubtedly Montanans were inspired with the populist theories
then spreading across the high plains. A wide range of measures
can show that Montana still is a state that treasures popular government. This persisting value of popular sovereignty should be a
primary consideration when the Montana Supreme Court determines its relationship to the political branches.
The stories of tort reform and welfare reform are not in line
with this tradition. In both instances the Montana Supreme Court
read a right into the state constitution and they used a formidable
analysis to overturn legislative classifications. Commentators have
called such equal protection analysis, when used by the United
States Supreme Court, substantive equal protection.175 They
thereby have compared it to the highly criticized and now discarded doctrine of substantive due process employed by judges to
171.

G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 97 (1977).
172. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-108 (1985) ("In this state there is no common law in
any case where the law is declared by statute.") and § 1-2-101 (1.985) ("in the construction
of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in
substance contained therein, not to assert what has been omitted or to omit what has been
inserted.").
173. See F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 127 (1969), and L.
FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 92 (1984).
174. FRIEDMAN, supra note 172, at 92.
175. See, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 SuP. CT. REV. 41.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1987

29

296

Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 2

MONTANA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

7
discover new property rights and void economic regulations.' 1
This kind of equal protection analysis is criticized for "lying well
outside what seems the core area of judicial competence. 1 ' 77 Its use
to allocate economic resources involves "the kind of policy one
concerned with institutional competence would leave to the judgment of the legislative branch.' 7 8 Its application to a legislative
enactment "would be child's play to a judge whose policy preferences impel him in that direction."'' 79 Thus the Montana Supreme
Court has been the willful actor in the state's political system.
Rather cavalierly it has disregarded a recent constituent assembly
and the authorized and good faith decisions of legislative representatives. The court's insistence that it must have the last word in
state policymaking has severely damaged democratic politics.

176. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). W. Eaton, in Courts under Siege,
Critical Legal Issues: Working Paper Series No. 7 (Washington Legal Foundation, 1986),
argues that the activism of the Lochner era was "much more benign" than the activism of
the Warren era: "[T]he acts of the Lochner Court were relatively discreet and limited. The
power of the Court was exercised only after government had affirmatively exercised its own
power. By contrast, the Warren usurpation operated in a generative, rather than a reactive
manner. It did not wait for government to pass a law which it then struck down as abhorrent to its social philosophy. Rather, it solicited a clientele, received countless proposals to
create new 'rights', and finally chose those 'rights' it wished to enshrine as 'constitutional.'"
Id. at 20-21.
177. Winter, supra note 174, at 100. See also J. Wallace, Whose Constitution? An
Inquiry into the Limits of Constitutional Interpretation,Critical Legal Issues: Working
Paper Series No. 6 (Washington Legal Foundation, 1986). Judge Wallace's argument against
judicial activism contains the following observation: "[sleparation of powers becomes a
meaningless slogan if judges may confer constitutional status on whichever rights they happen to deem important, regardless of a textual basis." Id. at 6.
178. Winter, supra note 174, at 100.
179. Id. at 101.
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